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Abstract: We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games
where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated
perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We prove that our algorithm
does not reveal private information of players to an honest-but-curious adversary who monitors
several nodes in the network. In contrast with differential privacy based algorithms, our method
does not sacrifice accuracy of equilibrium computation to provide privacy guarantees.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Aggregate games are non-cooperative games in which a
player’s payoff or cost depends on her own actions and
the sum-total of the actions taken by other players. In a
Cournot oligopoly for example, firms compete to supply a
product in a market with a price-responsive demand with
a goal to maximize profit. A firm’s profit depends on her
production cost as well as the market price, where the
latter only depends on the aggregate quantity of the prod-
uct offered in the market by all firms. Aggregate games
are widely studied in the literature, e.g., see Novshek
(1985); Jensen (2010). Multiple strategic interactions in
practice admit an aggregate game model, e.g., Cournot
competition models for wholesale electricity markets in
Willems et al. (2009); Cai et al. (2019); Cherukuri and
Corte´s (2019), supply function competition in general
economies see Jensen (2010), communication networks in
Teng et al. (2019); Koskie and Gajic (2005) and common
agency games in Martimort and Stole (2011). Aggregate
games are often potential games and a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium can be guaranteed to exist. In this paper, we
present an algorithm for networked players to compute
such an equilibrium in a distributed fashion that maintains
the privacy of players’ cost structures.
Players in a networked game can only communicate
with neighboring players in a communication graph. Dis-
tributed algorithms for computing Nash equilibrium in
networked games have a rich literature, e.g., see Koshal
et al. (2016); Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2018); Ye and
Hu (2017); Tatarenko et al. (2018); Parise et al. (2015).
The obvious difficulty in computing equilibrium strategy
arises due to the inability of a player to observe the
aggregate decision. Naturally distributed Nash computa-
tion proceeds via iterative estimation of the aggregate
decision followed by local payoff maximization (or cost
minimization) with a given aggregate estimate. Koshal
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et al. (2016); Parise et al. (2015) exploits consensus based
averaging, Koshal et al. (2016); Salehisadaghiani and Pavel
(2018) explore gossip based averaging, and Tatarenko et al.
(2018) employs gradient play along with acceleration for
aggregate estimation over networks.
1.1 Our Contributions
Algorithms for equilibrium computation were not designed
with privacy in mind. We show in Section 2.5, that an
honest-but-curious adversary can compromise a few nodes
in the network and observe the sequence of estimates to
infer other players’ payoff or cost structures for the algo-
rithm in Koshal et al. (2016). In other words, information
that allows distributed equilibrium computation can leak
players’ sensitive private information to adversaries.
Distributed equilibrium computation algorithms require
aggregate estimates to update their own actions. Our
proposed algorithm obfuscates local aggregate estimates
before sharing them with neighbors. The obfuscation step
involves players adding correlated perturbations to each
outgoing aggregate estimate. The perturbations are de-
signed such that they add to zero for each player. The
received perturbed aggregate estimates are averaged by
each player and used for updating strategy using local
projected gradient descent.
Our main result (Theorem 1) reveals that obfuscation via
correlated perturbations prevents an adversary from accu-
rately learning cost structures provided the network satis-
fies appropriate connectivity conditions. Players converge
to exact Nash equilibrium asymptotically. In other words,
we simultaneously achieve both privacy and accuracy in
distributed Nash computation in aggregate games. This
is in sharp contrast to differentially private algorithms
where trade-offs between accuracy and privacy guarantee
are fundamental, e.g., see Han et al. (2016).
Simulations in Section 4 validate our results and corrob-
orate our intuition that obfuscation slows down but does
not impede the convergence of the algorithm.
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2. EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION IN AGGREGATE
GAMES AND THE LACK OF PRIVACY
We begin by introducing a networked aggregate game. We
then present an adversary model and show that prior dis-
tributed equilibrium computation algorithms leak private
information of players. This exposition motivates the de-
velopment of privacy-preserving algorithms for equilibrium
computation in the next section.
2.1 The Networked Aggregate Game Model
Consider a game with N players that can communicate
over a fixed undirected network with reliable lossless links.
Model this communication network by graph G(V, E),
where each node in V := {1, . . . , N} denotes a player. Two
players i and j can communicate with each other if and
only if they share an edge in E , denoted as (i, j) ∈ E . Call
Ni the set of neighbors of node i and i ∈ Ni by definition.
Player i can take actions in a convex compact set Xi ⊆ Rd,
where R denotes the set of real numbers. Define X as the
Minkowski (set) sum of Xi’s and
x :=
N∑
j=1
xj
as the aggregate action of all players. For convenience,
define x−i :=
∑
j 6=i xi. We assume that ∩Ni=1Xi is non-
empty. For an action profile (x1, . . . , xN ), player i incurs
a cost that takes the form fi(xi, x) := fi (xi, xi + x−i).
This defines an aggregate game in that the actions of other
players affect player i only through the sum of actions of
all players, x.
Each player i ∈ V thus seeks to solve
minimize fi(xi, xi + x−i),
subject to xi ∈ Xi. (1)
For each i ∈ V, assume that fi(xi, y) is continuously
differentiable in (xi, y) over a domain that contains Xi×X .
Furthermore, for each i ∈ V, let xi 7→ fi(xi, x) be convex
over Xi and the gradient ∇xifi be uniformly L-Lipschitz,
i.e., ∃ L > 0 such that,
‖∇xifi(xi, u)−∇xifi(xi, u′)‖ ≤ L‖u− u′‖, (2)
for all u, u′ in X , xi in Xi. Throughout, ‖ · ‖ stands for
the `2-norm of its argument. Define X := ×Ni=1Xi and the
gradient map
φ(x) :=
 ∇x1f1(x1, x)...
∇xN fN (xN , x)
 (3)
for x := (xᵀ1 , x
ᵀ
2 , . . . , x
ᵀ
N )
ᵀ ∈ X . Assume throughout that
φ is strictly monotone over X , i.e.,
[φ(x)− φ(x′)]ᵀ (x− x′) > 0, (4)
for all x, x′ ∈ X and x 6= x′. Denote this game in the sequel
by game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V).
To provide a concrete example, consider the well-studied
Nash-Cournot game (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991))
among N suppliers competing to offer into a market for a
single commodity where the price p varies with demand
D as p(D) := a − bD. Supplier i offers to produce xi
amount of goods within its production capability modeled
as Xi ⊆ R+. Here R+ denotes the set of nonnegative
real numbers. To produce xi, supplier i incurs a cost of
ci(xi), where ci is increasing, convex and differentiable.
Each supplier seeks to maximize her profit, or equivalently,
minimize her loss. The loss of supplier i is
fi(xi, x) = ci(xi)− xip(x) = ci(xi)− xi(a− bx).
2.2 Equilibrium Definition and Existence
An action profile (x∗1, . . . x
∗
N ) defines a Nash equilibrium
of game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V) in pure strategies, if
fi
(
x∗i , x
∗
i + x
∗
−i
) ≤ fi (xi, xi + x∗−i) ,
for all xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ V.
The networked aggregate game, as described above, always
admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. See
Theorem 2.2.3 in Facchinei and Pang (2007) for details.
Given that an equilibrium always exists, prior literature
has studied distributed algorithms for players to compute
such an equilibrium.
2.3 Prior Algorithms for Distributed Nash Computation
We now describe the distributed algorithm in
Koshal et al. (2016) for equilibrium computation of
game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V). In Section 2.5, we demonstrate that
adversarial players can infer private information about cost
structures fi’s from observing a subset of the variables
during equilibrium computation using that algorithm.
While we only study the algorithm in Koshal et al.
(2016), our analysis can be extended to those presented
in Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2018); Ye and Hu (2017);
Tatarenko et al. (2018); Parise et al. (2015).
Recall that players in game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V) do not have
access to the aggregate decision. To allow equilibrium
computation, let players at iteration k maintain estimates
of the aggregate decision x as vk1 , . . . , v
k
N , initialized as,
v0i = x
0
i for each player i. At discrete time steps k ≥ 0,
each player transmits her own estimate of the aggregate
decision to its neighbors and updates her own action as,
v̂ki =
N∑
j=1
Wijv
k
j , (5a)
xk+1i = projXi
[
xki − αk∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )
]
, (5b)
vk+1i = v̂
k
i + x
k+1
i − xki . (5c)
Here, projXi stands for projection on Xi, and αk is a
common learning rate of all players.
The algorithm has three steps. First, player i computes a
weighted average of the estimates of the aggregate received
from its neighbors in (5a), where W is a symmetric doubly-
stochastic weighting matrix. The sparsity pattern of the
matrix follows that of graph G, i.e.,
Wij 6= 0 ⇐⇒ (i, j) ∈ E .
Second, player i performs a projected gradient update
in (5b) utilizing the weighted average of local aggregate
decision v̂ki in lieu of the true aggregate decision x. Finally,
she updates her own estimate of aggregate average in (5c)
based on her local decision xki and its update x
k+1
i .
2.4 Adversary Model and Privacy Definition
Consider an adversary A that compromises the players
in A ⊆ V. A is equipped with unbounded storage and
computational capabilities, and has access to all informa-
tion stored, processed locally and communicated to any
compromised players at all times. We define adversary
model using the information available to A.
(A) For a compromised node i ∈ A, A knows all local
information fi, x
k
i , v
k
i , v̂
k
i and information received
from neighbors of i i.e., vkj for j ∈ Ni at each k ≥ 0.
(B) A knows the algorithm for equilibrium computation
and its parameters {αk} and W .
(C) A observes aggregate decision xk at each k.
What does A seek to infer? The dependency of a player’s
cost on her own actions encodes private information. In the
Cournot competition example, this dependency is precisely
supplier i’s production cost – information that is business
sensitive. A seeks to exploit information sequence observed
from compromised players to infer private information of
other players. Intuitively, privacy implies inability of A to
infer private cost functions.
Denote the set of non-adversarial nodes by Ac := V \ A.
Call G(Ac) the restriction of G to Ac obtained by deleting
the adversarial nodes. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
For this example, A monitors all variables and parameters
pertaining to player 5, but seeks to infer the functions
f1, . . . , f4.
Fig. 1. Illustration of G and G(Ac). Here, A = {5} and
Ac = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Let Π denote the set of all permutations over all non-
adversarial nodes in Ac. Define the collection of games
F :=
{
game(G, {fpi(i),Xpi(i)}i∈V)
∣∣∣ pi ∈ Π}.
Thus, F comprises the games where the cost functions and
strategy sets of non-adversarial players are permuted. All
games in F have the same aggregate strategy x∗ at Nash
equilibrium. Next, we utilize F to define privacy.
Definition 1. (Privacy). Consider a distributed algorithm
to compute the Nash equilibrium of game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V).
If execution observed by adversary A is consistent with all
games in F , then the algorithm is private.
We define privacy as the inability of A to distinguish
between games in F . Even if A knew all possible costs
exactly–which is a tall order–our privacy definition implies
that A cannot associate such costs to specific players.
2.5 Privacy Breach in Algorithm (5)
Consider a Cournot competition among 5 players con-
nected according to G in Figure 1, where A has compro-
mised player 5. Assume that the equilibrium of the game
lies in the interior of each player’s strategy set. Recall that
A stores observed information at each k and processes it to
infer private cost information ci(xi). We argue how A can
compute cost functions c1(·), . . . , c4(·) up to a constant.
We first show privacy breach for player 4. A observes
{vk1 , vk3 , vk4 , vk5} at each k ≥ 0. A uses vk3 , vk4 , vk5 and W to
compute v̂k4 using (5a). Moreover, A uses (5c) to compute,
xk+14 − xk4 = vk+14 − v̂k4 .
For large enough k, the step-size αk is small enough to
ensure,
projXi
[
xki − αk∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )
]
≈ xki − αk∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki ).
At such large k, A uses (5b) along with (xk+14 − xk4) and
αk to calculate ∇x4f4(xk4 , Nv̂k4 ).
A uses information about strucutre of loss function i.e.
f4(x4, x) = c4(x4)−x4(a−bx), along with∇x4f4(xk4 , Nv̂k4 ),
v̂k4 , x
k and game parameters a, b to learn c′4(x
k
4). Several
observations of (xk4 , c
′
4(x
k
4)) allows A to learn the private
cost c4 upto a constant.
We showed that privacy breach for player 4, the same
analysis can be used for players 1, 2 and 3 with an
additional step. A observes xk, which tracks 1N
∑
i v
k
i
(Lemma 2 in Koshal et al. (2016)). A computes
vk2 = Nx
k − (vk1 + vk3 + vk4 + vk5 ).
Since {vk2} is available for each k ≥ 0, A uses same process
as above to show privacy breach for players 1, 2 and 3.
For algorithm (5), A uncovers all private cost functions
ci(·) for an example aggregate game. Next, we design
an algorithm that protects privacy of players’ private
information in the sense of Definition 1 against A.
3. OUR ALGORITHM AND ITS PROPERTIES
We propose and analyze Algorithm 1 that computes Nash
equilibrium of game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V) in a distributed fash-
ion. The main result (Theorem 1) shows that the algorithm
asymptotically converges to the equilibrium. Attempts by
A to recover each player’s cost structure, however, remain
unsuccessful.
The key idea behind our design is the injection of corre-
lated noise perturbations in the exchange of local estimates
of the aggregate decision. Different neighbors of player i
receive different estimates of the aggregate decision. The
perturbations added by any player i add to zero. While
A may still infer the true aggregate decision, the protocol
does not allow him to correctly infer the players’ iterates
or the gradients of their costs with respect to their own
actions. Our assumption on network connectivity requires
G(Ac) be connected and not be bipartite. Under these
conditions A cannot monitor all outgoing communication
channels from any player. We further show that one can
design noises in a way that A’s observations are consistent
with all games in F , making it impossible for him to
uncover cost for any specific player.
Throughout, assume that W is a doubly stochastic that
follows the sparsity pattern of G. Further, assume that
all non-diagonal, non-zero entries of W are identically
δ < 1N−1 .
Algorithm 1 Private Distributed Nash Computation
Input: Player i knows fi(xi, x), Xi, and δ. Consider a
non-increasing non-negative sequence α that satisfies
∞∑
k=1
αk =∞ and
∞∑
k=1
[αk]2 <∞. (6)
Initialize: For i ∈ V, v0i = x0i = x ∈ ∩iXi.
For k ≥ 0, players i ∈ V execute in parallel:
1: Construct |Ni| random numbers {rkij}, satisfying
rkii = 0 and
∑
j∈Ni
rkij = 0. (7)
2: Send obfuscated aggregate estimates vkij to j ∈ Ni,
where
vkij = v
k
i + α
krkij . (8)
3: Compute weighted average of received estimates vkji as
v̂ki =
N∑
j=1
Wijv
k
ji. (9)
4: Perform a projected gradient descent step as
xk+1i = projXi [x
k
i − αk∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )]. (10)
5: Update local aggregate estimate as
vk+1i = v̂
k
i + x
k+1
i − xki . (11)
At each time k, player i generates correlated random
numbers {rkij} satisfying rkii = 0 and
∑
j∈Ni r
k
ij = 0. Player
i then adds αkrkij to v
k
i to generate v
k
ij , the estimate sent
by player i to player j, according to (8). Let r denote
the collection of r’s for all players across time. Call r the
obfuscation sequence.
Each node i computes weighted average of received aggre-
gate estimates vkji to construct its own estimate aggregate
decision Nv̂ki , following (9). Players perform projected gra-
dient descent using local decision estimate xki , gradient of
cost function ∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki ), and non-summable, square-
summable step size αk (see (6)) to arrive at an improved
local decision estimate xk+1i using (10). Players then up-
date their local aggregate estimate using the change in
local decision estimate xk+1i − xki per (11). The properties
of our algorithm are summarized in the next result. The
proof is included in Section 5.
Theorem 1. Consider a networked aggregate game defined
as game(G, {fi,Xi}i∈V). If G(Ac) is connected and not
bipartite, then Algorithm 1 is private. Moreover, if the
obfuscation sequence is bounded, then Algorithm 1 asymp-
totically converges to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The convergence properties largely mimic that of dis-
tributed descent algorithms for equilibrium computation.
The locally balanced and bounded nature of the designed
noise together with decaying step-sizes ultimately drown
the effect of the noise. Computing balanced yet bounded
perturbations can be achieved using secure multiparty
computation protocols described in Gade and Vaidya
(2016, 2018b); Abbe et al. (2012). Our assumption on
G(Ac) is such that given two games F, F˜ from F and
an obfuscation sequence r, we are able to design a dif-
ferent obfuscation sequence r˜, such that the execution of
F perturbed with r generates identical observables as F˜
perturbed with r˜. The connectivity among non-adversarial
players in Ac is key to the success of our algorithm design.
Convergence speed depends on the size of the perturba-
tions. We investigate this link experimentally in Section 4,
but leave analytical characterization of this relationship
for future work. In what follows, we compare our algorithm
and its properties to other protocols for privacy preserva-
tion.
Comparison with Differentially Private Algorithms: Dif-
ferentially private algorithms for computing Nash equi-
librium of potential games have been studied in Dong
et al. (2015); Cummings et al. (2015). The algorithm in
Dong et al. (2015) executes a differentially private dis-
tributed mirror-descent algorithm to optimize the poten-
tial function. Experiments reveal that a trade-off arises
between accuracy and privacy parameters, i.e., the more
privacy one seeks, the less accurate the final output of
the algorithm becomes. Such a tradeoff is a hallmark of
differentially private algorithms, e.g., see Han et al. (2016).
Our algorithm on the other hand does not suffer from that
limitation. Notice that our definition of privacy is binary in
nature. That is, an algorithm for equilibrium computation
can either be private or non-private. We aim to explore
properties of our algorithmic architecture with notions of
privacy that allow for a degree of privacy and compare
them with differentially private algorithms.
Comparison to Cryptographic Methods: Authors in Lu
and Zhu (2015) use secure multiparty computation to
compute Nash equilibrium. Such an approach guarantees
privacy in an information theoretic sense. This protocol
provides privacy guarantees along with accuracy, similar
to our algorithmic framework. However, cryptographic
protocols are typically computationally expensive for large
problems (see Section V in Zhang et al. (2019)), and are
often difficult to implement in distributed settings.
Comparison to Private Distributed Optimization: Our
earlier work in Gade and Vaidya (2018b) has motivated
the design of Algorithm 1. While our prior work seeks
privacy-preserving distributed protocols to cooperatively
solve optimization problems, the current paper focuses
on non-cooperative games. Protocols in Gade and Vaidya
(2018b) advocate use of perturbations that cancel over the
network. Such a design is not appropriate for networked
games for two reasons. First, players must agree on noise
design, a premise that requires cooperation. Second, per-
turbing local functions fi’s, even if the changes cancel in
aggregate, can alter the equilibrium of the game.
Privacy in Client-Server architecture: This work con-
siders players communicating over a peer-to-peer net-
work. However, engineered distributed systems often have
a client-server architecture. Presence of a central server
entity allows for easy aggregate computation. However,
privacy is sacrificed if the parameter server is adversarial.
We have investigated privacy preservation for distribu-
tion optimization in this architecture in Gade and Vaidya
(2018a), where, we use multiple central servers instead of
Fig. 2. Communication network for Cournot network ex-
ample on N = 10 players.
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Fig. 3. Iterates generated by Algorithm 1 versus the
Algorithm in (5) for ∆ = {10, 20, 30, 50}.
one, a subset of which can be adversarial. We believe our
algorithm design and analysis in Gade and Vaidya (2018a)
can be extended to deal with private equilibrium compu-
tation for aggregate games in client-server framework.
4. A NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
Consider a Cournot competition with N = 10 players over
G described in Figure 2. Player i’s cost is given by
ci(xi) = ζi,2x
2
i + ζi,1xi.
The cost coefficients are drawn randomly from
ζi,2 ∼ unif[0, 1/2], ζi,1 ∼ unif[0, 1]
for each i. The strategy sets are identically Xi = [0, 5] for
each i. Choose δ = 110 that parameterizes the matrix W .
Let the price vary with demand D as
p(D) = 6− 1
10
D.
We initialize the algorithm with x0 = 1 identically for all
players. We use secure multi-party computing technique in
Gade and Vaidya (2018b) to design obfuscation sequence
r that satisfies (7) and
|rkij | ≤ ∆.
The trajectory of the average distance of xki ’s from x
∗
i
across players with αk := (k+ 1)
0.51 is shown in Figure 3.
Our algorithm converges to the equilibrium similar to the
non-private algorithm in (5). However, its convergence is
slower as seen in Figure 3. The slowdown is especially
pronounced for large ∆’s and is an artifact of perturba-
tions added by players to obfuscate information from the
adversary. Thus, our algorithm design achieves privacy
and asymptotic convergence to equilibrium, but sacrifices
speed of convergence. An analytical characterization of the
slowdown defines an interesting direction for future work.
5. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
5.1 Proving Algorithm 1 is Private
Recall that G(Ac) is the graph over non-adversarial nodes
Ac. Suppose Ac has M nodes. Let I, J be two players in
Ac and
F := (fi,Xi)i∈V , F˜ := (f˜i, X˜i)i∈V ,
be two games in F such that F˜ is identical to F , except
that costs and strategy sets of players I and J are switched:
f˜I = fJ , f˜J = fI , X˜I = XJ , X˜J = XI .
For convenience, define pi : V → V as the permutation that
encodes the switch, i.e.,
pi(I) = J, pi(J) = I, and pi(i) = i for all i 6= I, J.
Consider the execution of Algorithm 1 on F , given by
E(F, r, x ) := {(xki , vki , v̂ki ) for i ∈ V, k ≥ 0},
with obfuscation sequence r used in (8), initialized with
x ∈ ∩Ni=1Xi. We prove that there exists an obfuscation
sequence r˜ such that execution E(F˜ , r˜, x ) of Algorithm
1 on F˜ with r˜ starting from x , is identical to E(F, r, x ),
from A’s perspective. An arbitrary permutation over Ac
is equivalent to a composition of a sequence of switches
among two players in Ac. As a result, the algorithm
execution on games in F can be made to appear identical
from A’s standpoint, proving the privacy of Algorithm 1.
In the rest of the proof, we show how to construct r˜ that
ensures E(F˜ , r˜, x ) and E(F, r, x ) appear identical to A.
Adversary observes {xkj , vkj , v̂kj } for all j ∈ A at each k ≥ 0.
Consequently, perturbations utilized by corrupted nodes
j ∈ A are same in both executions,
r˜kji = r
k
ji for all j ∈ A. (12)
Moreover, A observes v̂kj for all j ∈ A and hence, all
messages received by j ∈ A from i ∈ Ac, denoted by vkij ,
are identical for both executions, i.e.,
v˜kij = v
k
ij ⇐⇒ v˜ki + αkr˜kij = vki + αkrkij
⇐⇒ αkr˜kij = vki + αkrkij − v˜ki .
(13)
Adversary observes xk for each k ≥ 0. Enforcing
x˜ki = x
k
pi(i), v˜
k
i = v
k
pi(i),
̂˜vki = v̂kpi(i),
results in x˜
k
= xk. We havê˜vki = v̂kpi(i)
⇐⇒
∑
j∈Ni
Wij(v˜
k
j + α
kr˜kji) =
∑
j∈Npi(i)
Wpi(i)j(v
k
j + α
krkjpi(i))
⇐⇒
∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
r˜kji =
1
αkδ
∑
j∈Npi(i)
Wpi(i)j(v
k
j + α
krkjpi(i))
− 1
αkδ
∑
j∈Ni
Wijv
k
pi(j) −
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kji. (14)
The obfuscation used by each player i ∈ Ac is locally
balanced, and hence, we have∑
j∈Ni
r˜kij = 0 ⇐⇒
∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
r˜kij = −
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kij . (15)
Let γ be a vector of r˜kij ’s for i, j ∈ Ac. In the sequel,
let 1 denote a vector of ones of appropriate dimension.
For graph G(Ac), define its oriented incidence matrix B,
adjacency matrix A, degree matrix D, and the normalized
graph Laplacian matrix L as
Bij =

1, if node i is head of edge j,
−1, if node i is tail of edge j,
0, otherwise,
Aij =
{
1, if (i, j) is edge in G(Ac),
0, otherwise,
D = diag(A1), and L = I −D−1/2AD−1/2.
Using the notation z+ := max{z, 0} and z− := z+−z for a
scalar z, define B+ and B− as the matrices obtained from
B, applying the respective operator componentwise. Then,
(14) - (15) can be written as(
B− B+
B+ B−
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=T
γ =
(
ξ1
ξ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ξ
,
We prove that,
rank T = rank (T | ξ) = 2M − 1, (16)
to show that Tγ = ξ admits at least one solution.
Notice that
(1
ᵀ | − 1ᵀ)
(
B− B+
B+ B−
)
=
(−1ᵀB | 1ᵀB) = 0, (17)
proving that rows of T are not linearly independent. Next,
we show that rank T ≥ 2M − 1. To that end, we have
rank T = rank (TT
ᵀ
)
= rank
(
B−B
ᵀ
− +B+B
ᵀ
+ B−B
ᵀ
+ +B+B
ᵀ
−
B+B
ᵀ
− +B−B
ᵀ
+ B−B
ᵀ
− +B+B
ᵀ
+
)
(a)
= rank
(
D A
A D
)
= rank D + rank (D −AD−1A)
= M + rank (IM −D−1/2AD−1AD−1/2)
= M + rank (IM − (IM − L)2)
= M + rank (2L− L2)
(b)
≥ M + rank L︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M−1
+rank (2IM − L)−M
(c)
= M − 1 + rank (2IM − L)
= 2M − 1, (18)
where IM is the M ×M identity matrix. Here, (a) follows
from the definition of B+, B−, D,A, (b) follows from
Sylvester’s nullity theorem (see Horn and Johnson (2012))
and the fact that the rank of graph Laplapcian for the
connected graphG(Ac) on M nodes is M−1. Furthermore,
since G(Ac) is not bipartite, the eigenvalues of L are
strictly less than 2, according to Lemma 1.7 in Chung
and Graham (1997). Therefore, we have rank (2I − L) =
M that implies (c). Thus, (17) and (18) together yield
rank T = 2M − 1.
For the augmented matrix (T | ξ), we have
2M − 1 ≤ rank (T | ξ) ≤ 2M. (19)
In the above relation, the inequality on the left follows from
our earlier proof that rank T = 2M − 1. The one on the
right follows from the fact that the augmented matrix has
2M rows. We demonstrate that rows of (T | ξ) are linearly
dependent to conclude (16). From (17), we deduce(
1
ᵀ | − 1ᵀ) (T | ξ) = (0 | 1ᵀξ1 − 1ᵀξ2) .
Now, we show 1T ξ1 − 1T ξ2 = 0 to conclude the proof. In
the following, |Z| computes the cardinality of a set Z.
1T ξ1 − 1T ξ2
=
1
αkδ
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Npi(i)
Wpi(i)j(v
k
j + α
krkjpi(i))
− 1
αkδ
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni
Wijv
k
pi(j) −
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kji +
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kij
=
1
αkδ
∑
i∈Ac
 ∑
j∈Npi(i)
Wpi(i)jv
k
j −
∑
j∈Ni
Wijv
k
pi(j)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Q1
+
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Npi(i)
rkjpi(i) −
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kji +
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kij︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Q2
= Q1 +Q2,
where we have used rkii = 0 and Wij = δ for (i, j) ∈ E .
Utilizing pi(i) = i, for all i 6= I, J , simplify Q1 as
αkQ1
=
1
δ
∑
i∈Ac
[∑
j∈Ni
Wijv
k
j −
∑
j∈Ni
Wijv
k
pi(j)
]
=
1
δ
∑
i∈Ac
[ ∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
Wijv
k
j −
∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
Wijv
k
pi(j)
]
=
1
δ
∑
i∈Ac
(1− (|Ni| − 1)δ) vki + ∑
j∈Ni∩Ac\{i}
δvkj

− 1
δ
∑
i∈Ac
(1− (|Ni| − 1)δ) vkpi(i) + ∑
j∈Ni∩Ac\{i}
δvkpi(j)

=
∑
i∈Ac
(1
δ
− |Ni|+ 1
)(
vki − vkpi(i)
)
+
∑
j∈Ni∩Ac\{i}
(
vkj − vkpi(j)
)
=
(
|NI ∩ Ac \ {I}|+ 1
δ
− |NI |+ 1
)(
vkI − vkJ
)
+
(
|NJ ∩ Ac \ {J}|+ 1
δ
− |NJ |+ 1
)(
vkJ − vkI
)
= (|NI ∩ Ac \ {I}| − |NI |)
(
vkI − vkJ
)
+ (|NJ ∩ Ac \ {J}| − |NJ |)
(
vkJ − vkI
)
.
Next, simplify Q2 as
Q2=
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni
rkji −
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kji +
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kij
(a)
=
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
rkji +
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
r˜kij
(b)
=
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
rkji +
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
[
1
αk
(vki − vkpi(i)) + rkij
]
(c)
=
∑
i∈Ac
( ∑
j∈Ni∩Ac
rkji +
∑
j∈Ni∩A
rkij
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∑
i∈Ac
∑
j∈Ni∩A
[
1
αk
(vki − vkpi(i))
]
(d)
=
1
αk
∑
i∈Ac
|Ni ∩ A|(vki − vkpi(i))
=
1
αk
|NI ∩ A|
(
vkI − vkJ
)
+
1
αk
|NJ ∩ A|
(
vkJ − vkI
)
.
Here, (a) follows from rkji = r˜
k
ji for all j ∈ A from (12).
The equality in (b) follows from (13), (c) from (15), and
(d) from the properties of permutation pi. Combining the
expressions for Q1 and Q2, we get
Q1 +Q2
=
1
αk
[|NI ∩ Ac \ {I}| − |NI ]
(
vkI − vkJ
)
+
1
αk
[|NJ ∩ Ac \ {J}| − |NJ |] .
(
vkJ − vkI
)
+
1
αk
|NI ∩ A|
(
vkI − vkJ
)
+
1
αk
|NJ ∩ A|
(
vkJ − vkI
)
= 0,
where the last line leverages the relation
|Ni ∩ A|+ |Ni ∩ Ac \ {i}| = |Ni| − 1
for i = I, J . This completes the proof of privacy of our
algorithm. 2
5.2 Proving Algorithm 1 Converges to Nash Equilibrium
The non-expansiveness of the projection operator yields
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2
= ‖projXi [xki − αk∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )]− x∗i ‖2
= ‖projXi [xki − αk∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )]
− projXi [x∗i − αk∇xifi(x∗i , x∗)]‖2
≤ ‖xki − x∗i − αk(∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )−∇xifi(x∗i , x∗))‖2
= ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + [αk]2‖∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )−∇xifi(x∗i , x∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=T1
i
− 2αk(∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )−∇xifi(x∗i , x∗))ᵀ(xki − x∗i ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=T2
i
(20)
Owing to the compactness of X ’s, gradients ∇xifi are
bounded. Such a bound, together with triangle inequality,
yields an upper bound on T 1i as
T 1i ≤ [αk]2C2. (21)
Define
yk :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
vki , C
′ := max
i
max
xi∈Xi
‖xki − x∗i ‖
and bound T 2i as
T 2i = 2α
k
[
∇xifi(xki , Nv̂ki )−∇xifi(xki , Nyk)
]ᵀ
(xki − x∗i )
+ 2αk
[
∇xifi(xki , Nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x∗)
]ᵀ
(xki − x∗i )
≥ −2αkNLC′‖v̂ki − yk‖
+ 2αk
[
∇xifi(xki , Nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x∗)
]ᵀ
(xki − x∗i ), (22)
where we use Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lipschitz
continuity of ∇xifi. To further simplify the bounds on T 2i ,
we show that Nyk = xk using induction as follows. For
k = 0, the relation follows from v0i = x
0
i . Assume that it
holds for k = 1, . . . ,K, i.e., NyK = xK . Then, we have
NyK+1 =
N∑
i=1
vK+1i
(a)
=
N∑
i=1
(
v̂Ki + x
K+1
i − xKi
)
(b)
=
N∑
i=1
[
N∑
j=1
Wij
(
vKj + α
KrKji
)
+ xK+1i − xKi
]
(c)
=
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Wij︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
vKj + δα
K
N∑
j=1
N∑
i∈Nj
rKji︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ xK+1 − xK
(d)
= NyK + xK+1 − xK
= xK+1, (23)
where, (a) follows from (11), (b) from (8), (c) from the
doubly stochastic nature of W and (7). Finally, (d) follows
from the induction hypothesis.
Substitute Nyk = xk in (21) and combine that with (22)
in (20). The result, summed over i ∈ V gives
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + [αk]2NC2 + 2αkNLC′
N∑
i=1
‖yk − v̂ki ‖
− 2
N∑
i=1
αk
[
∇xifi(xki , xk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x∗)
]ᵀ
(xki − x∗i )
= ‖xk − x∗‖2 + [αk]2NC2 + 2αkNLC′
N∑
i=1
‖yk − v̂ki ‖
− 2αk
[
φ(xk)− φ(x∗)
]ᵀ
(xk − x∗). (24)
We bound one of the terms on the right-hand side of the
above relation in the next result.
Lemma 1.
∑∞
k=0 α
k‖yk − v̂ki ‖ <∞, for all i ∈ V.
The proof relies on the doubly stochastic nature of W and
two properties of obfuscation sequence – boundedness of
r and balancedness property from (7). We omit the proof
due to space limitations. The square summability of α’s,
Lemma 1 along with (24) allow us to infer that ‖xk−x∗‖2
converges and
∞∑
k=0
αkΦ(xk) :=
∞∑
k=0
αk
[
φ(xk)− φ(x∗)]ᵀ (xk − x∗) <∞
using Theorem 1 in Robbins and Siegmund (1985). The
α-sequence is nonsummable and φ is strictly monotone.
Therefore, we have
lim inf
k→∞
Φ(xk) = 0.
The sequence of xk’s remains bounded. Consider its
bounded subsequence xk
`
along which
lim
`→∞
Φ(xk
`
) = lim inf
k→∞
Φ(xk) = 0.
This subsequence admits a convergent subsequence, along
which Φ goes to zero. Strict monotonicity of φ implies that
this subsequence converges to x∗. Recall that ‖xk − x∗‖2
converges, and this distance converges to zero over said
subsequence, implying limk→∞ xk = x∗. This completes
the proof of Theorem 1. 2
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered aggregate games played by
agents that communicate over a network, each with private
information. We showed that distributed algorithms for
equilibrium computation in the literature are not designed
with privacy requirements in mind, and consequently
leak private information about players against honest-but-
curious adversaries. Our proposed algorithm for NE com-
putation exploits correlated perturbations to obfuscate ag-
gregate estimates shared over the network. The algorithm
asymptotically converges to the Nash Equilibrium. If the
graph connecting non-adversarial players is connected and
not bipartite, we show that our algorithm protects private
information of non-adversarial players.
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